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A conservation law in physics can be either a constraint on the kinds of interaction
there could be or a coincidence of the kinds of interactions there actually are. This is
an important, unjustly neglected distinction. Only if a conservation law constrains the
possible kinds of interaction can a derivation from it constitute a scientific explanation
despite failing to describe the causal/mechanical details behind the result derived. This
conception of the relation between “bottom-up” scientific explanations and one kind
of “top-down” scientific explanation is motivated by several examples from classical
and modern physics.
1. Introduction. At the close of “Four Decades of Scientific Explanation,”
Wesley Salmon (1989, 182–85) contrasts “bottom-up” and “top-down”
approaches to scientific explanation (borrowing this terminology from
Philip Kitcher). An explanation taking a bottom-up approach describes
the causal processes, interactions, and (often hidden) mechanisms re-
sponsible for particular occurrences or general regularities, as when the
kinetic-molecular theory of gases explains Boyle’s law. In contrast, an
explanation taking a top-down approach subsumes the explanandum un-
der some extremely general principles, thereby unifying it with other
facts—as when general relativity’s principle of equivalence explains the
behavior of a helium-filled balloon in an airplane accelerating for takeoff.
(A bottom-up explanation might instead cite the cabin air pressure gra-
dient.) Salmon suggests that there exist both top-down and bottom-up
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scientific explanations. They can provide different kinds of understanding
of the same fact: “It is my present conviction that both of these expla-
nations are legitimate and each is illuminating in its own way” (183–84).
Salmon’s view may seem an uneasy rapprochement between causal/
mechanical and unificationist pictures of scientific explanation. Suppose
we recognize some detailed causal/mechanical account as specifying how
a given explanandum comes about. Then we may well find it difficult to
see how a top-down account could possibly make any explanatory con-
tribution at all. Of course, a top-down argument might have allowed us
to discover the explanandum without having to rely on any theory of the
microphysical details responsible for it. But this valuable heuristic role
should not be confused with an explanation. Although Salmon does not
mention it, Einstein (1954) famously draws a similar distinction between
bottom-up “constructive theories” (Einstein’s example is the same as Sal-
mon’s: the kinetic-molecular theory of gases) and top-down “theories of
principle” (Einstein’s examples: thermodynamics and relativity). But in
contrast to Salmon, Einstein is generally interpreted as regarding only
constructive theories as explanatory since he says, “When we say that we
have succeeded in understanding a group of natural processes, we invar-
iably mean that a constructive theory has been found which covers the
processes in question” (228). Many philosophers (e.g., Brown 2005;
DiSalle 2006, 115–16) have agreed with Einstein while so interpreting him,
and many philosophers (e.g., Elster 2007) regard all explanations as causal
explanations. Bottom-up explanations can thus make it difficult to ac-
knowledge top-down explanations. The reverse can also happen. Suppose
we see how an outcome follows from some general principle that must
hold for any possible mechanism. Then, although an account of the par-
ticular mechanism actually at work supplies us with further information
about the case, we may well regard this welter of causal detail as ex-
planatorily superfluous since the result would still have obtained on any
mechanism obeying the general principle.
Nevertheless, I believe that Salmon is correct in contending that both
bottom-up and top-down arguments can be explanatory. One important
kind of top-down argument in physics proceeds from conservation laws.
Yet when some relationship can receive a bottom-up, causal/mechanical
explanation, it may well be difficult to see how its derivation from a
conservation law could explain it rather than merely be a convenient
means of predicting it. In this article, I will first sharpen this challenge
to the explanatory power of conservation laws and then show how this
challenge can be met. I will identify what it would take for an argument
from conservation laws to explain despite failing to describe the underlying
causal mechanism. I will identify a distinctive explanatory contribution
that conservation laws can make—a contribution that cannot be made
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Figure 1.
by any causal/mechanical account (no matter how detailed) of the same
explanandum. In particular, I will argue that a conservation law explains
when it is a constraint on the kinds of interaction there could have been
and not when it is a coincidence of the kinds of interactions there happen
to be. I will elaborate this modal distinction and show its importance to
scientific explanation in several examples from classical and modern phys-
ics.
2. A Challenge to Explanations Appealing to Conservation Laws. Let’s
take a simple example of a putative explanation using a conservation
law—in this case, energy conservation—and let’s compare this “expla-
nation” to the standard causal/mechanical explanation of the same fact.
(For simplicity, I assume classical physics throughout.) The explanandum
is Archimedes’ Principle: that the buoyant force on a body surrounded
by an ideally incompressible, nonviscous fluid in a container at rest in a
uniform downward gravitational field equals the weight of the fluid dis-
placed by the body. The bottom-up explanation of Archimedes’ Principle
is hydrostatic. As the physicist James Trefil says, “Archimedes’ principle
can be understood in terms of kinetic theory. . . . For a completely sub-
merged object, the pressure will be less on its top than on its bottom—
the molecules of the fluid will be hitting the bottom of the object with a
greater force than those hitting the top. This is the molecular origin of
the upward buoyant force” (2003, 22).
More fully (see, e.g., Pnueli and Gutfinger 1992), the hydrostatic ex-
planation begins by defining a fluid as a continuum that cannot resist a
change in its shape, so the force that one fluid parcel feels from contact
with another is perpendicular to its surface. Since the fluid parcels are all
at equilibrium (i.e., not accelerating), it follows (from Newton’s second
law of motion) that the forces exerted on all sides of a fluid parcel sum
to zero. Shrinking the parcel to a point, we find that at any point in the
fluid, there is a well-defined pressure P that is equal in all directions.
Take a cubical parcel of fluid (see fig. 1), each side of length s, its faces
336 MARC LANGE
Figure 2.
aligned with the coordinate axes and small enough that the pressure is
uniform over any given side. Since the pressure force on a face is per-
pendicular to it, the total force in the z (upward) direction exerted on the
parcel by contact with the surrounding fluid is the magnitude s2P(Z) of
the force on the cube’s base, all points of which have Z as their z-coordinate,
minus the magnitude s2P(Z  s) of the force on the cube’s top, totaling
. Gravity is the only force on the parcel that does3s [P(Z  s)  P(Z)] /s
not act by contact; it has only a z-component: , where r is the fluid’s3rs g
density. By Newton’s second law, for3 3rs g  s [P(Z  s)  P(Z)] /s p maz
the parcel’s mass m and z-acceleration az. Dividing by s
3 and taking the
limit as s approaches zero, we find . Since therg  (dP/dz) (Z) p raz
fluid’s parcels are at equilibrium, az p 0, so .(dP/dz) (Z) p rg
Suppose (for simplicity) that the submerged body is a cylinder of height
h with horizontal top and bottom surfaces, each of area A (see fig. 2).
Let Z be the bottom surface’s z-coordinate. The force downward on the
top surface exerted by the fluid above it at pressure P(Z  h) is AP(Z 
h); the upward force on the cylinder’s bottom surface exerted by the fluid
below it at pressure P(Z) is AP(Z). (The pressure exerts forces only per-
pendicular to the cylinder’s surface, so no upward or downward force is
exerted on the cylinder’s sides.) The net z-force is then A[P(Z)  P(Z 
. The cylinder’s volume is Ah, so the massZhh)] p A (dP/dz) dz p Argh∫Z
of the fluid it displaces is Arh. That fluid’s weight is Argh, which (we just
saw) equals the buoyant force.1
That was a bottom-up explanation of Archimedes’ Principle. A top-
down derivation from energy conservation is sometimes presented as also
explaining why the principle holds, as in a physics journal article (Leroy
1. For an arbitrarily shaped object, the calculation yields the same result: the body is
decomposed into thin cylindrical elements, and although their top and bottom surfaces
may tilt arbitrarily relative to the horizontal, the horizontal components of the pressure
forces perpendicular to the body’s variously tilted surface elements at any given level
z add to zero.
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1985, 56) that said that in view of the top-down derivation, “the origin
of the buoyancy force need no longer be mysterious and therefore hidden
behind a principle; it can be explained in physical terms.” (For similar
remarks, see also Rudiak 1964; Tarasov and Tarasova 1973, 121; and
Keeports 2002.)
Here is the top-down derivation. Suppose an applied upward force F
just suffices to raise the submerged body by a vertical distance d; the body
is moved arbitrarily slowly without any superfluous motion of the fluid
(see fig. 3). By energy conservation, the work Fd thereby done on the
system equals the energy added to the system. Since the fluid is ideal,
none of the work goes into overcoming friction (which would have raised
the fluid’s internal energy), and so it all goes into changing the system’s
gravitational potential energy. The body’s gravitational potential energy
rises by , where Mb is the body’s mass. As the body rises, fluid flowsM gdb
downward to fill the space it vacates. As a result of its journey, the body
effectively trades places with a fluid parcel of the body’s size and shape
that was initially located at a distance d above the body’s initial position
(see fig. 3). That parcel thus descends by d, so its gravitational potential
energy diminishes by , where Mp is the parcel’s mass. Setting theM gdp
work done equal to the net increase in the system’s potential energy, we
find . Therefore, . By contrast, hadFd p M gd  M gd F p M g  M gb p b p
there been no fluid, then the force just sufficient to raise the body would
have been simply —just enough to balance the body’s weight. ButM gb
with the fluid present, we need less force by —the weight of the fluidM gp
displaced by the body. That upward force supplementing F is the buoyant
force.
Of course, this argument does not reveal how the buoyant force acts.
Admittedly, the bottom-up explanation also fails to identify the funda-
mental force at work in molecular collisions. But it does at least reveal
that the buoyant force is exerted through these collisions. The derivation
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from energy conservation shows that the buoyant force must be present
but fails to uncover the causal mechanism by which it acts. Thus, a dis-
tinctive explanatory contribution is made by the hydrostatic derivation.
However, it would be question begging to argue that the derivation
from energy conservation is not explanatory simply because it is not a
bottom-up, causal/mechanical account. Accordingly, let’s sharpen this
challenge to the top-down derivation’s explanatory power. Energy con-
servation’s role in this derivation is apparently only to ensure that grav-
itational interactions conserve energy, thereby making “gravitational po-
tential energy” well defined and allowing the work done on the system
to equal the change in its gravitational potential energy. Energy conser-
vation as a comprehensive principle—as covering all fundamental types
of interaction—appears to be largely irrelevant. That is, if we think of
energy conservation as a long conjunction (that gravitational interactions
conserve energy and electrical interactions conserve energy and magnetic
interactions conserve energy, and so on, and there are no other kinds of
interactions) with one conjunct for each species of fundamental interac-
tion, then most of these conjuncts are irrelevant to the top-down “expla-
nation” of Archimedes’ Principle.2
Of course, their irrelevance does not demonstrate the irrelevance of the
fact that gravitational interactions conserve energy. But if they are irrel-
evant to explaining Archimedes’ Principle, then the comprehensive law
of energy conservation is also irrelevant since it includes irrelevant con-
juncts. Hence, each separate top-down “explanation” that apparently ap-
peals to the comprehensive law of energy conservation in order to explain
some or another phenomenon actually uses only the fact that energy is
conserved by the particular types of interaction at work in producing that
phenomenon. Therefore, these derivations do not all proceed from a com-
mon premise (the comprehensive law of energy conservation). Apparently,
then, these various derivations fail to achieve the kind of grand unification
that was supposed (by Salmon, at least) to be the source of their explan-
atory power. A top-down argument, then, does not explain the buoyant
force, although it still allows us to calculate the force’s strength without
having to deal with the complicated causal/mechanical details we en-
countered in proceeding from the bottom up.
We have, here, a challenge to top-down explanations that appeal to
conservation laws. To see what we should make of this challenge, let’s
identify some of its presuppositions and evaluate their plausibility.
Let’s first examine the challenge’s final step: that since the derivation
2. By “irrelevant,” I mean explanatorily irrelevant, not irrelevant confirmation-wise.
That various species of interaction all conserve energy might be some evidence that a
given other species does too.
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of Archimedes’ Principle from energy’s conservation in gravitational in-
teractions cannot unify Archimedes’ Principle with the results of non-
gravitational interactions, the derivation cannot achieve the kind of grand
unification that would be needed to supply it with explanatory power,
and so the derivation cannot explain why Archimedes’ Principle holds.
This step presupposes that a top-down explanation must acquire its ex-
planatory power from its capacity to unify. However, the challenge to the
explanatory power of the comprehensive principle of energy conservation
can actually do without this unificationist conception of the source of
explanatory power. To launch the challenge, it is enough that energy
conservation cannot explain if it fails to unify across the range of different
kinds of interactions; the challenge need not presuppose that any ex-
planatory power possessed by the conservation law must arise from some
sort of unification it achieves. The unification may be a product of the
explanation.
Plausibly, energy conservation explains only if it unifies various phe-
nomena involving different kinds of interactions. Precisely this sort of
unification is frequently emphasized as the most notable achievement of
the conservation laws. As Richard Feynman (1967, 59) puts it, “When
learning about the laws of physics you find that there are a large number
of complicated and detailed laws, laws of gravitation, of electricity and
magnetism, nuclear interactions, and so on, but across the variety of these
detailed laws there sweep great general principles which all the laws seem
to follow. Examples of these are the principles of conservation.” What
sort of unification would a grand conservation law thus produce? It would
unify by being an important premise that is shared by explanations of
various phenomena resulting from otherwise unrelated kinds of interac-
tions. That is, it would be an important premise common to various
derivations (such as the derivation of Archimedes’ Principle) that explain
particular facts having bottom-up explanations involving entirely distinct
kinds of forces. As a common explainer, it would then unify in much the
same way as a common cause does (although, of course, no law is, strictly
speaking, a cause).
But this “unification” would be trivial if a suitable common premise
could be produced on the cheap: simply by conjoining premises appearing
in separate explanations. For example, consider an explanation of the
gravitational force between a given pair of bodies that appeals to Newton’s
gravitational-force law, and also consider a Coulomb’s-law explanation
of the electrostatic force between a particular pair of bodies. We cannot
transform these two explanations into explanations that share an impor-
tant premise (constituting a common explainer) merely by replacing both
of the force laws in the respective explanations with their conjunction.
The two derivations would then still be valid, but having this arbitrary
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conjunction as a premise would deprive each of them of any explanatory
power. That energy conservation might be a similar arbitrary conjunction
(of the fact that gravitational interactions conserve energy and electrical
interactions conserve energy and so on) was the core of the challenge I
posed to the conservation law’s explanatory power.
If energy conservation fails to unify across the various actual kinds of
interaction, couldn’t Archimedes’ Principle still be explained by energy’s
conservation in gravitational interactions? Perhaps it could. But suppose
that this derivation of Archimedes’ Principle invokes energy conservation
merely as holding of gravitational interactions; suppose the comprehensive
principle of energy conservation is an arbitrary conjunction since each
conjunct is explained by a different force law, and so the principle is
explanatorily irrelevant to Archimedes’ Principle because many conjuncts
are explanatorily irrelevant. (More on this in a moment.) Then energy’s
conservation in gravitational interactions is explained by the gravitational-
force law, and so an appeal to gravity’s conserving energy becomes just
an appeal to an important feature of that force law. The derivation of
Archimedes’ Principle from energy conservation in gravitational inter-
actions, then, appears not to be a top-down explanation. Rather, the
gravitational-force law helps to explain both Archimedes’ Principle and
the fact that gravitational interactions conserve energy—so that even if
the derivation of Archimedes’ Principle from gravity’s conserving energy
is an explanation (rather than merely a means of calculating the buoyant
force’s strength without having to deal with the intricacies of the hydro-
dynamic derivation), it is just another bottom-up explanation. Energy’s
conservation in gravitational interactions, then, does not help to explain
anything about the gravitational-force law that powers the hydrodynamic
explanation. On the contrary, the force law helps to explain why energy
is conserved in gravitational interactions. Energy conservation does not
stand “above” the force laws at all.
To identify what it would amount to for energy conservation to stand
above the force laws, properly positioned to figure in top-down expla-
nations, is exactly the challenge I issued earlier. Let’s now look more
closely at another part of that challenge: that the comprehensive law of
energy conservation is an “arbitrary conjunction” of separate conserva-
tion laws concerning various distinct kinds of interactions rather than (as
Feynman says) a single principle sweeping across the various force laws.
In that case, I suggested, Archimedes’ Principle is not explained by the
comprehensive conservation law because that law includes explanatorily
irrelevant conjuncts. Of course, that these conjuncts are unneeded for
entailing Archimedes’ Principle fails to show that they do not help to
explain Archimedes’ Principle. That the scope of some law serving as a
premise in an explanation can be diminished without rendering the der-
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ivation invalid does not show that the derivation appeals to some ex-
planatorily irrelevant premises and so fails to explain. For example, the
4-dyne electrostatic force between a given pair of point charges at rest is
explained by Coulomb’s law (and the fact that the two charges are 1
centimeter apart and two statcoulombs each), even though the derivation
remains valid if Coulomb’s law is replaced by a much narrower Coulombic
law: that any two point charges of 2 statcoulombs each, at rest 1 centimeter
apart, exert 4-dyne electrostatic forces on each other. Coulomb’s law is
not explanatorily irrelevant to the 4-dyne force, even though “most” of
Coulomb’s law can be omitted from the derivation without undermining
its validity.
In contrast, however, suppose we take the original explanation and
replace Coulomb’s law with that law conjoined with some other arbitrary
law, such as Newton’s gravitational-force law. Then we no longer have
an explanation of the 4-dyne electrostatic force.3 With an arbitrary con-
junct, the derivation remains deductively valid but contains explanatorily
irrelevant premises. The challenge, then, is to specify what it would take
for the comprehensive law of energy conservation to be like Coulomb’s
law (which is not an arbitrary conjunction) rather than like the (arbitrary)
conjunction of Coulomb’s law with Newton’s gravitational-force law.
There are actually two challenges here. One challenge is to understand
what makes Coulomb’s law different from the conjunction of Coulomb’s
law with the gravitational-force law—that is, what makes the latter but
not the former an “arbitrary conjunction.” Here is perhaps another way
to express this challenge: What makes the electrostatic force constitute a
single natural kind of interaction (or, at least, a subclass of a single natural
kind), and, in contrast, what makes gravitational and electrostatic forces
not belong to a single natural kind of force? (I shall later sketch a possible
answer to this question.) The second challenge (on which I shall mainly
3. Perhaps it initially seems to you that the addition of Newton’s law does not ruin
the explanation. I insist that it does: gravitational forces play no part in generating
the force to be explained, so the gravitational-force law is explanatorily irrelevant, and
an explanation can include nothing explanatorily irrelevant. Any temptation to think
that the gravitational-force law does not ruin the explanation, but merely constitutes
a harmless superfluous premise within an explanation, may be accounted for by the
fact that it is easy to see how one could start with the derivation using Coulomb’s law
conjoined with the gravitational-force law and then transform it into an explanation
(simply by slicing off the gravitational-force law). Therefore, the derivation from the
arbitrary conjunction “contains” an explanation and can inform us of an explanation
without itself constituting an explanation. Compare this example involving Coulomb’s
law conjoined with the gravitational-force law to the example in the “notorious” foot-
note 33 (originally n. 28) in Hempel and Oppenheim’s landmark 1948 essay on expla-
nation (Hempel 1965, 273), where the conjunction of Kepler’s and Boyle’s laws is
described as entailing but not explaining Kepler’s laws.
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focus) is to understand what it would take for the comprehensive law of
energy conservation not to be an arbitrary conjunction of various con-
servation laws regarding separate kinds of force. That is, what would
enable the comprehensive law of energy conservation to help explain Ar-
chimedes’ Principle despite the derivation’s requiring for its validity only
energy’s conservation by a single kind of force?
This second challenge is made especially serious by the fact that the
comprehensive law of energy conservation seems a good deal like the
conjunction of Coulomb’s law with the gravitational-force law. In other
words, it seems to be the conjunction of several principles concerning
distinct natural kinds of force (namely, that gravitational interactions
conserve energy and electrical interactions conserve energy and so on).
Presumably, whatever it is that would make the comprehensive law of
energy conservation able to explain Archimedes’ Principle would also
enable such a top-down explanation to contribute something that cannot
be supplied by the bottom-up, hydrodynamic explanation of Archimedes’
Principle. I shall now try to identify what that contribution would be—
and to use it to suggest what it would take for the comprehensive law of
energy conservation to explain Archimedes’ Principle.
3. Conservation Laws as Constraints or Coincidences.
3.1. Introducing the Distinction between Constraints and Coincidences. As
I noted, the hydrostatic explanation must presuppose that an ideal fluid
left to itself in a container at rest in a uniform gravitational field is at
equilibrium; that is, its parcels are not accelerating. This fact about ideal
fluids could apparently be explained by a complete inventory of the actual
kinds of forces: none disturbs such a fluid’s equilibrium.
Newton’s second law of motion does not preclude the existence of
additional kinds of forces on the fluid. Newton’s law requires only that
any such forces be associated with corresponding accelerations. Suppose
there had been an additional force that any fluid, left to itself, naturally
experiences—a force not among the actual kinds. In particular, suppose
that there had been a further fundamental force law requiring that a fluid’s
parcels, initially at rest, feel a force that puts them into a top-to-bottom-
to-top circulation: without the intervention of any outside agency, some
higher parcels are continually pulled downward and lower parcels pushed
upward. The details of the parcels’ resulting acceleration do not matter.
The point is that such a force would not conflict with Newton’s second
law of motion, but it would interfere with the hydrostatic explanation of
Archimedes’ Principle. Therefore, the premises used by that explanation
must rule out such a force by entailing that the fluid, left to itself, is in
equilibrium.
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As far as the hydrostatic explanation is concerned, the fact that no
actual kind of force produces such a circulation could be just a coinci-
dence. In other words, the reason why no actual kind of force produces
such a circulation could be that one type of force does not, another type
does not, and so forth, for every actual type of force, with each type of
force having this feature for its own separate reason (namely, because of
its own force law). That two actual types of fundamental force (e.g.,
electric and gravitational) are alike in failing to induce a circulation would
then have no common explanation. The lack of any common explanation
would make it a coincidence that the two forces are alike in failing to
induce a circulation—just as if you go to the mall this afternoon for one
reason and I go for an unrelated reason, then our both being there at the
same time is a coincidence since my being there and your being there have
no common explainer.4 The hydrostatic explanation offers no common
explanation of the various actual types of forces all failing to induce a
circulation since the hydrostatic explanation simply starts with the par-
ticular kinds of forces there actually are. (Every explanation must start
somewhere.)
In contrast, I will now suggest, a top-down explanation employs the
law of energy conservation as a constraint on the kinds of forces there
could have been. A force arising from no outside agency that would make
the fluid parcels spontaneously begin to circulate from rest would violate
energy conservation: in beginning to circulate, the parcels’ kinetic energy
would increase, but their total potential energy would be unchanged. (As
ascending parcels gain gravitational potential energy, descending parcels
lose an equal quantity of it.) Energy conservation as a constraint rules
out any circulating force and so constitutes a common explainer of the
fact that (for instance) electric and gravitational forces are alike in failing
to induce fluid circulation.5
A top-down explanation of Archimedes’ Principle from the compre-
hensive law of energy conservation would thus make an explanatory con-
tribution that cannot be made by a bottom-up explanation, no matter
how detailed. (I will say more about this contribution in a moment.) But
4. Or, at least, they have no common explainer of any interest in the context of some
particular demand for an explanation. Perhaps we both traveled to the mall by using
our own cars, so the principles of the internal combustion engine are common explainers
of our each arriving at the mall. But these are not the sorts of explainers that we would
typically be asking for.
5. The points I make in terms of Archimedes’ Principle could instead have been made
by using Stevinus’s 1586 clootcrans argument for the law of the inclined plane; energy
conservation would then preclude the chain loop, having been laid at rest across the
prism, from beginning to turn. Halonen and Hintikka (1999, 32) deem this derivation
explanatory. My aim is to determine what would make it so.
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for energy conservation to supply this explanation, the conservation law
cannot be a coincidence. In other words, it cannot be that the various
force laws explain why energy is always conserved. Rather, that one force
conserves energy and that another does, too, must have a common ex-
planation in the conservation law. For the law of energy conservation to
explain why no circulation-inducing force exists, the law has to be a
constraint on the fundamental forces there could be; it has to demand
that whatever the fundamental forces happen to be, they conserve energy.
If it constrains the forces there could be, then the conservation law is not
equivalent to the long conjunction from section 2: that gravitational in-
teractions conserve energy and electrical interactions conserve energy and
magnetic interactions conserve energy, and so on, and there are no other
kinds of interactions. The conservation law does not refer to particular
kinds of interactions or depend on the kinds of interactions there happen
to be. It is not an arbitrary conjunction.
Earlier, we saw Feynman describe energy conservation as a constraint:
that the conservation laws are general principles that all of the force laws
must follow. Likewise, Mark Steiner (1978, 22) writes, “Laws of conser-
vation are simply not causal laws. They provide constraints on what is
allowed to happen.” I am not arguing that conservation laws do in fact
constitute such constraints. My aim is merely to identify what it would
take for an argument from the conservation laws to explain if its explan-
atory power does not derive from its describing the underlying causal
mechanism—that is, what it would take for such an argument to constitute
a top-down explanation.
A bottom-up explanation of Archimedes’ Principle takes for granted
the fluid’s equilibrium (or the inventory of fundamental forces), whereas
energy conservation explains why the fluid is at equilibrium by making
any forces that fail to conserve energy impossible—but only if energy
conservation is a constraint on the forces. In that case, the top-down
argument makes a distinctive explanatory contribution. Of course, even
the bottom-up explanation deems it no accident (i.e., deems it physically
necessary) that there exists no circulation-inducing force since the natural
laws suffice to fix the inventory of forces. But that every actual type of
force is alike in failing to induce fluid circulation is still a coincidence if
there is no common explanation for two different types of force being
alike in this respect. By contrast, it is no coincidence if energy conservation
constrains the possible force laws.
3.2. The Distinction Defined in Terms of Counterfactuals. Let’s now
try to be more precise about what it would take to make the conservation
law a constraint rather than a coincidence. To say that energy conservation
constrains the possible force laws is to say that energy would still have
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been conserved, even if there had been additional kinds of force (i.e.,
forces that are not electric or gravitational, etc.) acting together with the
actual kinds. On the other hand, to say that energy conservation is a
coincidence of the actual force laws is to say that it is not the case that
energy would still have been conserved, had there been additional kinds
of force. Rather, energy is conserved because, as it happens, each of the
actual kinds of force conserves energy as a result of its own particular
force law. So had there been additional kinds of force, energy might still
have been conserved, but then again, it might not have been, depending
on the force laws of the additional forces.
One way for a conservation law to be a constraint is for it to follow
from other principles that are constraints and so would still have held,
even if the there had been additional kinds of force. For instance, as is
well known, various classical conservation laws follow from space-time
symmetries within a Hamiltonian dynamical framework: energy conser-
vation follows from the laws’ invariance under arbitrary temporal dis-
placement, linear momentum conservation from their invariance under
arbitrary spatial displacement, and so forth. If the space-time symmetries
and dynamical framework would have been no different, even if there
had been an additional kind of force, then the conservation laws would
still have held, too, and so they constrain the possible force laws. As
Eugene Wigner (1972, 13) says, “For those [conservation laws] which
derive from the geometrical principles of invariance it is clear that their
validity transcends that of any special theory—gravitational, electromag-
netic, etc.—which are only loosely connected.”
In other words, Wigner contends that those symmetries are not co-
incidences of the particular kinds of forces there happen to be, and so
the associated conservation laws transcend the idiosyncrasies of the force
laws figuring in bottom-up explanations. (For more on the role of coun-
terfactuals in enabling symmetry principles to explain conservation laws,
see Lange [2007, 2009].)
3.3. The Distinctive Explanatory Contribution Made by Constraints. If
the comprehensive law of energy conservation constrains the possible force
laws, then it explains why no force makes fluid parcels spontaneously
begin to circulate from rest, thereby explaining a premise of the hydro-
dynamic derivation of Archimedes’ Principle. Of course, that no actual
force would put such a fluid into circulation also follows from an inventory
of the various actual kinds of forces. However, that inventory portrays
the fact that there is no circulating force as a kind of coincidence; it
identifies no common explainer of the fact that electric forces would not
put the fluid into circulation and the fact that gravitational forces would
not either. In contrast, the absence of a circulating force is no coincidence
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if energy conservation is a constraint on the kinds of forces there could
have been. Therefore, if energy conservation is a constraint, then the
absence of a circulating force is not explained by the inventory of the
kinds of forces there actually are since any such proposed explanation
mischaracterizes the explanandum as a coincidental upshot of the par-
ticular kinds of forces there happen to be, rather than as necessary in
view of the kinds of forces there could have been.
Hence, if energy conservation is a constraint, then the absence of a
circulating force has no bottom-up explanation from an inventory of the
actual kinds of forces. Rather, it has only a top-down explanation. The
same applies to the fact that there is no force that violates energy con-
servation. If energy conservation is a constraint, then any proposal for
explaining why every force conserves energy by appealing to the particular
kinds of forces there actually are (i.e., from the bottom up) inaccurately
portrays the explanandum as a coincidence. Thus, by making the con-
servation law no arbitrary conjunction, the conservation law’s status as
a constraint not only would enable it to withstand the challenge we saw
(in sec. 2) to its capacity to explain Archimedes’ Principle but also would
make a top-down explanation able to contribute something that cannot
be supplied by any bottom-up explanation of Archimedes’ Principle. (This
is exactly the kind of connection we sought at the end of sec. 2.)
3.4. Constraints/Coincidences versus Laws/Accidents. I have cashed
out the distinction between energy conservation as a constraint and energy
conservation as a coincidence in terms of the conservation law’s behavior
in connection with counterfactuals. Of course, the distinction between
laws and accidents is also frequently cashed out in this way (see Lange
2009). For example, whereas Coulomb’s law would still have held, even
if there had existed additional charged bodies, the accident that all of the
families living on my block have two children might not still have held,
had there been additional families living on the block. As a constraint on
the force laws, then, a conservation law is in some ways like a law of
those laws—a higher-order law. (We saw Feynman describe the conser-
vation laws in similar terms, as “great general principles which all the
[force] laws seem to follow.”) A standard view is that laws explain their
instances, whereas accidents do not (e.g., we cannot explain why my family
has two children by appealing to the fact that all of the families on our
block have two children since it is just a coincidence that all of those
families have two children). Similarly, the fact that various actual forces
conserve energy is explained by energy conservation as a constraint on
the forces but not by energy conservation as a coincidental similarity
among them. If energy conservation is a coincidence, then the fact that
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various actual forces conserve energy is explained by the respective force
laws.
However, the distinction I have drawn between constraints and co-
incidences is not identical to the familiar distinction between laws and
accidents. Even as a coincidence rather than a constraint, energy’s con-
servation would logically follow from the laws alone and so would not
be an accident. It would be physically necessary. Accordingly, there is an
important difference between the counterfactuals used to illustrate the
law/accident distinction and the counterfactuals used to illustrate the con-
straint/coincidence distinction. The counterfactuals used to illustrate the
distinction between laws and accidents have antecedents that all represent
physical possibilities, such as “had there been additional charged bodies”
or “had there been additional families living on our block.” In contrast,
a physical impossibility is posited by the counterfactual antecedent (“had
there been additional kinds of forces”) figuring in the distinction between
constraints and coincidences; that counterfactual is a counterlegal. Thus,
although the distinction between constraints and coincidences is a modal
distinction, like the distinction between laws and accidents, the two dis-
tinctions are not the same.6
3.5. One Constraint Distinguished from Several. Just as Coulomb’s law
would still have held if there had been additional bodies, so likewise an
arbitrary conjunction of several laws (such as Coulomb’s law conjoined
with the gravitational-force law) would still have held had there been
additional bodies since each of its conjuncts would still have held. The
distinction between Coulomb’s law and Coulomb’s law conjoined with
the gravitational-force law is not the distinction between a law and an
accident. Rather, it is the distinction between a single law and an arbitrary
conjunction of two laws. An analogous distinction at the level of con-
straints would be between a single constraint and an arbitrary conjunction
of two constraints. (That arbitrary conjunction is not what I have termed
a “coincidence” since both conjuncts would still have held, even if there
had been additional kinds of forces.) Perhaps these distinctions, too, can
be cashed out somehow in terms of differences in behavior in connection
with counterfactuals. Let me briefly sketch a tentative proposal along
6. The constraint/coincidence distinction is modal. As a coincidence, energy conser-
vation would be no more necessary than the particular force laws there actually happen
to be since those laws would be responsible for it. In contrast, as a constraint on the
forces there could have been, energy conservation would be more necessary than the
actual force laws (as befits a higher-order law); it would still have held, even if the
force laws had been different.
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these lines before returning to the distinction between constraints and
coincidences.
If Coulomb’s law had been violated sometime before today, then with
Coulomb’s law “out of the way,” there would have been nothing to keep
Coulomb’s law from being violated after today; it might well, then, have
been violated. The same applies to other ways of subdividing Coulomb’s
law into two “parts”; it is not an arbitrary conjunction of two separate
laws. In contrast, the conjunction of Coulomb’s law with Newton’s grav-
itational-force law behaves differently: had one of these laws not held,
the other would still have held. That the various fundamental force laws
behave in this way is frequently assumed by philosophers and physicists
describing how different the universe would have been if a given force
had been a little bit different. For example, it is frequently remarked that
had the strong nuclear force been slightly weaker, then it would have been
insufficient to bind two protons together into one nucleus. This remark
presupposes that had the strong force been slightly weaker, the mutual
electromagnetic repulsion of two protons would have been no different.
By the same token, had the gravitational force been slightly stronger, then
none of the stars in the “main sequence” except the bluest could have
formed—but only because the strengths of the other forces would have
been no different (Barrow and Tipler 1986, 322–27; Carter 1990, 132–33).
Under these counterlegal antecedents, “all other things” are held fixed—
and the other force laws count as genuinely other things.
The mutual counterfactual independence of the various force laws
cashes out Wigner’s remark (quoted earlier) that the various force laws
are “only loosely connected.” Perhaps similar relations of mutual coun-
terfactual independence likewise help to distinguish a single constraint
from an arbitrary conjunction of two constraints. Suppose energy con-
servation is a single constraint (as it would be if it were explained by a
single symmetry principle). Then had gravitational forces failed to con-
serve energy, the constraint would not have obtained, and so with it “out
of the way,” there would have been nothing to keep other nonconservative
forces from existing. In contrast, suppose energy conservation is actually
a conjunction of two constraints (perhaps one constraint covering only
kinds of forces that can both attract and repel, and another constraint
covering only kinds of forces that either exclusively attract or exclusively
repel). Then had one of these constraints not obtained, the other would
not have been compromised. Whether it is a single constraint or a con-
junction of two constraints, though, energy conservation would not be a
coincidence of the kinds of forces there happen to be.
3.6. Other Applications. Let me now return to the idea that conser-
vation laws as constraints must be distinguished from conservation laws
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as coincidences—and that a conservation law can supply a top-down
explanation only if it is a constraint. These ideas apply to many examples
beyond the simple case involving Archimedes’ Principle on which I have
concentrated so far.
The status of some conservation laws is not yet known, and conse-
quently their explanatory significance remains unresolved. Consider, for
instance, the conservation of baryon number in contemporary physics.
By energy conservation, an isolated proton can decay only into particles
that have less rest mass than it does, and the proton is the lightest baryon
(i.e., the lightest particle with nonzero baryon number). The conservation
of baryon number thus entails that the proton is stable. Does baryon-
number conservation explain why the proton is stable? The answer re-
mains controversial.
It is no explanation if the conservation of baryon number is a so-
called accidental symmetry (a term that was introduced by Steven Wein-
berg; see Weinberg 1995, 529). An accidental symmetry reflects merely
the particular forces in action at lower-energy regimes rather than some
deeper “symmetry of the underlying theory” (529). Accordingly, if baryon-
number conservation is an accidental symmetry, then it may not even
hold at higher energies (and so the proton may turn out not to be stable
but rather to have an extremely long half-life). But even if an accidental
symmetry is unbroken, it would still be a coincidence of the particular
kinds of interactions written “by hand” into the underlying theory, and
so it would fail to explain. (The stability of the lightest baryon would
then help to explain why baryon number turns out to be conserved, not
vice versa.)
However, baryon-number conservation may instead turn out to be a
consequence of a more fundamental symmetry, in which case it would
explain the proton’s stability. Thus, whereas some physicists cite baryon-
number conservation as explaining why the proton is stable (e.g., Duffin
1980, 82; Davies 1986, 159), other physicists put scare quotes around
“explain” (Lederman and Teresi 1993, 303) or say that the jury is still out
(Ne’eman and Kirsh 1996, 150–51). My point is that the uncertainty
regarding the conservation law’s explanatory power is matched by the
uncertainty regarding the law’s status as a constraint or coincidence.7
7. Kosso (2000) also investigates the distinction between fundamental and accidental
symmetries (although not in connection with the explanatory power of conservation
laws). He says that a symmetry is accidental in virtue of having no relations to other
features of nature; whether a symmetry is fundamental or accidental, according to
Kosso, is a “holistic” matter, not a matter of the symmetry’s modal status or its capacity
to play a particular explanatory role. In contrast, I understand accidental symmetries
as symmetries that impose no constraints on the allowable interactions in that the
symmetries might not still have held had there been different kinds of interactions.
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4. Conclusion. I would like to return to Archimedes’ Principle in order
to make two concluding points regarding top-down explanations. First,
the distinction between constraints and coincidences applies not only to
conservation laws but also to other principles used in top-down deriva-
tions. For example, Archimedes’ Principle is sometimes derived from the
Principle of Virtual Work (PVW; as in Mach 1960, 125). The PVW says
that a mechanical system acted on by various outside forces is in equi-
librium exactly when no total work is done by those forces in any “virtual
displacement,” that is, hypothetical infinitesimal change in the positions
of the system’s components in accordance with the constraints on the
system. To derive Archimedes’ Principle from the PVW, suppose (for the
sake of simplicity) that the submerged body is a cube of side s with
horizontal top and bottom faces. If its virtual displacement consists of
its descent by dh, then a body slab of volume effectively descends2s dh
by s, and a fluid parcel of the same volume ascends by s. Gravity performs
virtual work on the body and on the fluid (for body3 3gr s dh gr s dhb f
density rb and fluid density rf), so by PVW, the system is in equilibrium
if rb p rf. Therefore, any submerged body must experience an upward
force that would balance its weight if rb p rf (i.e., if its weight were equal
to that of the fluid it displaces)—that is, an upward force equal to the
weight of the displaced fluid.
Whether this derivation from the PVW explains Archimedes’ Principle
is recognized as depending on whether the PVW is a constraint or a
coincidence. A common view (Whewell 1874, bk. VI, chap. ii, sec. 4, 333;
Lanczos 1986, 77) is that the PVW holds in virtue of the fact that in each
elementary kind of mechanical system (e.g., lever, pulley, wheel), the total
work done by the forces of constraint under any virtual displacement is
zero. But these conjuncts, one for each kind of simple machine, have no
common explanation, so the PVW does not unify. Instead, it is a coin-
cidence and hence not explanatory. Accordingly, Whewell says of the PVW
that it “serves verbally to conjoin Laws . . . than to exhibit a connexion
in them: it is rather a help for the memory than a proof for the reason.”8
8. The “principle of least [better: stationary] action” has likewise been interpreted
sometimes as a constraint but more commonly as a coincidence. For instance, Planck
(1948, 48) said that it has generally been regarded as a coincidence: “In present-day
physics the principle of least action plays a relatively minor role. It does not quite fit
into the framework of present theories. Of course, admittedly it is a correct statement;
yet usually it serves not as the foundation of the theory, but as a true but dispensable
appendix, because present theoretical physics is entirely tailored to the principle of
infinitesimal local effects. . . . Physics hence is inclined to view the principle of least
action more as a formal and accidental curiosity than as a pillar of physical knowledge.”
Clearly, “accidental” here does not mean “lacking in physical necessity” but rather
means “a coincidence of the laws”: a logical consequence of them where there is no
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Finally, there is another important difference between the hydrostatic
and energy-conservation explanations of Archimedes’ Principle. As we
have seen, the hydrostatic explanation determines that the buoyant force
equals the weight of the displaced fluid by first calculating the buoyant
force hydrostatically, then independently determining the weight of the
displaced fluid, and then noting that these coincide. The weight of the
displaced fluid does not play any role in the derivation of the buoyant
force. The various factors in the weight of the displaced fluid enterArgh
the buoyant force’s hydrostatic derivation separately: h arises from the
pressure difference between the submerged body’s top and bottom, A as
the area of the surface on which the pressure force acts, and rg from the
pressure gradient. Fortuitously, it seems, there arise just the factors that
together give the weight of the displaced fluid.
In contrast, this relation between the buoyant force and the weight of
the displaced fluid is revealed to be no coincidence by the explanation
from energy conservation. There, the weight of the displaced fluid func-
tions as a unit throughout since the displaced fluid descends as the sub-
merged body ascends. That the body’s size and shape should combine
with the fluid’s density is no coincidence, considering that both charac-
terize the displaced parcel of fluid, which itself figures in the derivation.
Thus, if the derivation from energy conservation is an explanation (be-
cause energy conservation is a constraint), then it is able to explain why
the buoyant force turns out to equal the weight of the displaced fluid
without portraying this fact as arising by algebraic coincidence.
In short, if energy conservation is a constraint, then the explanation
from energy conservation reveals the reason why a quantity equal to the
weight of the displaced fluid figures in the expression for the buoyant
force. This reason is then not revealed by the hydrostatic explanation
because that explanation incorrectly depicts it as a coincidence that each
of the various factors in the expression for the weight of the displaced
fluid appears in the expression for the buoyant force. In fact, it is no
coincidence, if the explanation from energy conservation goes through.
Rather, each of the factors in the expression for the weight of the displaced
fluid appears for the very same reason in the expression for the buoyant
force. With the parcel of displaced fluid, they all enter the derivation
together.
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